In a recent decision, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that a man who was terminated after reporting the sexual harassment of his girlfriend at the hands of their mutual supervisor had not been discriminated against based upon his gender by virtue of his “association” with the girlfriend. 

In Stezzi v. Aramark Sports, LLC, the plaintiff filed a complaint of sexual harassment with his employer, Aramark, on behalf of his girlfriend, whom he alleged was being sexually harassed by their supervisor.  The plaintiff subsequently complained that the supervisor had also threatened him personally.  A meeting was held at which Aramark’s representatives assured the plaintiff that the supervisor would stay away from him.  Nine months later, after not having any contact with him, the supervisor passed the plaintiff in the hallway and said “good job” to him.  The plaintiff then complained to management, after which his employment was terminated by Aramark for creating an "intimidating and offensive work environment."

The plaintiff filed suit, alleging both sex discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA).  In order to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the plaintiff was required to establish that he was a member of a protected class which, as a white male, he was not.  He thus tried to establish a prima facie case through his “association” with his girlfriend, alleging that the supervisor’s harassment of him was motivated by his gender as he was dating the girlfriend on whose behalf he filed a sexual harassment complaint and that the supervisor would not have harassed him but for his gender and the fact that he was dating the girlfriend.

The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s argument of “associational” discrimination, finding that although it had previously allowed “associational” discrimination based upon race, neither it nor its appellate court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, had extended that doctrine to include “associational” discrimination based upon gender.  The trial court further found that the plaintiff had not established that he had been terminated or discriminated against due to his gender, but only due to his relationship with his girlfriend, and that merely being in a relationship with a person who may have been subject to discrimination was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. 

Notwithstanding the adverse holding on “associational” discrimination, the trial court did not dismiss the plaintiff’s action altogether as it allowed his retaliation claim.  The trial court believed that, by complaining about the harassment of his girlfriend, the plaintiff had engaged in “a protected activity” and that he had offered enough evidence to raise an inference that he had suffered an adverse employment action due to him engaging in the protected activity. 

This newsletter is a publication of Nochumson P.C. and is intended for general information only. It should not be construed as legal advice with respect to any particular situation, and readers should not act upon information contained in this newsletter without first consulting an attorney. Copyright © 2009.