In a recent decision, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania declined to broadly interpret the newly-enacted Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (“Ledbetter Fair Pay Act”).

In Rowland v. Certainteed Corp., a woman filed suit against her former employer for failing to promote her and terminating her due to her gender.  The employer alleged that most of her claims were time-barred as they occurred more than 300 days prior to her filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

The woman countered that the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act allowed her to introduce evidence of ‘discriminatory acts’ which occurred outside of the 300-day time period and permitted her to seek damages for “other instances of similar discrimination which took place outside the limitations period.” 

The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was signed into law on January 29, 2009, extending the time limitation for filing a charge of wage discrimination with the EEOC under Title VII or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).  Specifically, the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act amended Title VII, as well as the ADEA, to specify that a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice “occurs” every time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory compensation decision or practice.  With respect to Title VII, the legislation states that “an unlawful employment practice occurs … when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.”

Rejecting the woman’s claim of a continuing violation, the federal district court found that each time the former employer failed to promote her constituted a discrete act of alleged discrimination subject to the 300-day statute of limitations. 

Moreover, the federal district court found that the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was limited to discriminatory compensation actions only and was thus inapplicable to the claims made in Rowland.  Considering the newness of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, it remains to be seen whether other courts will similarly limit its application or opt for a broader interpretation, perhaps based on the phrase “other practice”.