A unanimous three-judge panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the Philadelphia Police Department is not required to accommodate a female officer’s request to wear the Muslim headscarf, hijaab. 

In Webb v. City of Philadelphia, the officer, who is a practicing Muslim, was temporarily suspended for insubordination for wearing the hijaab, a scarf covering her head and the back of her neck, with her police uniform.   The Police Department maintained that the officer’s wearing of the hijaab was in violation of its directive regulating the approved uniform and equipment for officers.  In response, the officer filed a charge of religious discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and subsequently filed suit against the City in federal district court. 

The district court ruled in favor of the City on the grounds that the City would suffer an “undue hardship” if forced to permit its officers to wear religious clothing or ornamentation with their uniforms and that its directive contains strict guidelines on officers’ attire which “not only promote[s] the need for uniformity, but also enhance[s] cohesiveness, cooperation, and the esprit de corps of the police force.”

On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the City. 

The Third Circuit initially found that the officer had met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in that she held a sincere religious belief that conflicted with a job requirement, had informed her employer of the conflict, and was disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement. 

Once an employee establishes the prima facie case of religious discrimination, the burden then shifts to the employer to show either that it made a good-faith effort to reasonably accommodate the religious belief or that such an accommodation would cause an “undue hardship” upon the employer and its business. 

The City stated that it could not offer any accommodation under the circumstances because any such accommodation would impose an “undue hardship”.  In support of its argument, the City offered the testimony of former Police Commissioner Sylvester Johnson who testified that uniformity “encourages the subordination of personal preferences in favor of the overall policing mission” and conveys “a sense of authority and competence to other officers inside the Department, as well as to the general public.”  If not for the strict enforcement of its directive, the City contended that the essential values of impartiality, religious neutrality, uniformity, and the subordination of personal preference would be compromised to the detriment of the proper functioning of the Police Department.   Former Commissioner Johnson specifically identified the Police Department’s appearance of religious neutrality, as symbolized by its uniform, as vital in both dealing with the public and working together cooperatively.

The Third Circuit agreed with the City, finding that allowing religious dress or symbolism to be worn with the police uniform would impose an “undue hardship”.  Relying upon prior federal court decisions, the Third Circuit pointed out that the Police Department was a para-military entity which required a disciplined rank and file for efficient conduct of its affairs.  The Third Circuit held that the reasons cited by Commissioner Johnson met the “undue hardship” test in that uniform requirements were crucial to the safety of officers (so they can easily be identified, based on their uniform appearance), morale and esprit de corps, and public confidence in the Police Department.