

A recent decision handed down by the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in Portis v. River House
Associates sheds new light on what legal measures residential
lease applicants in
In Portis, the federal
court summarily dismissed an attempt by rental applicants to sue for
racial discrimination under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
and
In 2005, a married African-American woman, who was relocating from
out of state to central
After doing so, the general manager left the couple to run a credit
history on the wife.
When the general manager returned, she indicated that the credit
check showed no credit history for the wife and requested to run
such a check on the husband instead. The husband complied with the general manager’s request even
though the wife insisted she had an established credit history.
The general manager then left the couple again to check the
husband’s credit. Upon
her return, the general manager stated that the credit check showed
no credit history for him as well. Visibly frustrated, the couple demanded that the general
manager re-run the credit checks. After the couple left the property management office, the
general manager claimed she had run credit checks several times for
both of them but that no such history was available for either of
them.
According to the general manager, all of these credit checks were
performed through a company named First American Registry Inc.
Due to the alleged absence of a credit history for the couple,
Korman Communities demanded that the wife pay a security deposit of
a greater amount than originally represented and a non-refundable
move-in fee to secure the lease. The couple refused to agree to these new terms.
One week later, the wife completed a rental application and leased
an apartment unit down the road at
Similar to Korman Communities,
Soon thereafter, the couple contacted First American Registry Inc.
to ascertain why their credit histories were not made available to
Korman Communities. They
were advised that neither the general manager nor any employee of
Korman Communities requested such histories, and that the only
requests for their credit were made by
Believing that they were subjected to racial discrimination, the
couple filed suit against Korman Communities and its general manager
for violations of the ECOA and UTPCPL, among other causes of action.
The general manager and Korman Communities then filed a
motion to dismiss these statutory claims.
As for the ECOA claim, the defendants argued that the couple lacked
a viable cause of action because leasing residential property does
not constitute a credit transaction under the ECOA.
The federal court first examined both the actual text of the ECOA as well as Congress’s findings and statement for the ECOA.:p
The ECOA provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any creditor to
discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a
credit transaction . . . on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the
applicant has the capacity to contract).” After reviewing this passage of the ECOA, the federal court
focused its inquiry on how the terms “creditor” and “credit
transaction” are defined under the ECOA. The federal court noted that, although the ECOA did not
define the term “credit transaction”, the terms “credit” and
“creditor” are defined and “their definitions provide some insight:
‘credit’ denotes ‘the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to
defer payment of debt or to incur debts and defer its payment or to
purchase property or services and defer payment therefor;’
‘creditor’ refers to ‘any person who regularly extends, renews, or
continues credit; any person who regularly arranges for the
extension, renewal, or continuation of credit; or any assignee of an
original creditor who participates in the decision to extend, renew,
or continue credit.’” Since the U.S. Supreme Court and the 3rd U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals have never considered application of the ECOA in
the residential lease context, the federal court thus relied upon
Congress’s findings and statement of the ECOA’s purpose as well as
the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit’s
ruling in Laramore v. Ritchie Realty Management Co. for further guidance.
According to Congress, “there is a need to insure that the various
financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extensions of
credit exercise their responsibility to make credit available with
fairness, impartiality, and without discrimination on the basis of
sex or marital status. Economic stabilization would be enhanced and
competition among the various financial institutions and other firms
engaged in the extension of credit would be strengthened by an
absence of discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status, as
well as by the informed use of credit which Congress has heretofore
sought to promote.
It is the purpose of [ECOA] to require that financial institutions
and other firms engaged in the extension of credit make that credit
equally available to all creditworthy customers without regard to
sex or marital status.” In Laramore, the 7th Circuit found that the ECOA does not apply to “typical” residential
leases.
The federal court in Portis,
after reviewing the allegations contained in the complaint,
similarly found no reason that the lease which the couple “sought
was sufficiently extraordinary to render it within the ECOA.” Relying heavily upon the underlying basis set forth by the 7th Circuit in Laramore, the
federal court in Portis found “sound Laramore’s reasoning that ‘the typical residential lease involves a
contemporaneous exchange of consideration -- the tenant pays rent to
the landlord on the first of each month for the right to continue to
occupy the premises for the coming month.’” The federal court concluded that, “generally speaking,
residential leases are not credit transactions and landlords are not
creditors under the ECOA.” According to the federal court, there was no indication in
the complaint that the couple sought a lease containing any
extraordinary terms or conditions that could render the lease a
credit transaction under the ECOA.
Rather, the federal court emphasized that the complaint repeatedly
alleged that the couple merely sought to lease an apartment.
The federal court in Portis also found that the complaint already included a claim under the
Fair Housing Act, “any application of the ECOA to the instant
circumstances would be duplicative and superfluous.” The federal court next addressed the viability of the
couple’s claim under UTPCPL.
The federal court, similar to its analysis under the ECOA, turned to
the text of that statute.
The UTPCPL prohibits “’unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce.’ Should such unsavory practices be employed, the UTPCPL
permits certain private and public actors to bring suit.
Specifically, private actions may be filed by ‘any person who
purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family
or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of
money or property, as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act or
practice declared unlawful by this act,’ and the Attorney General or
a District Attorney may bring an action when he or she ‘has reason
to believe that any person is using or is about to use any method,
act or practice declared by [the UTPCPL] to be unlawful, and that
proceedings would be in the public interest.’” The federal court pointed out that “the UTPCPL clearly
permits private actors to bring suit only when they purchase or
lease goods or services.” Thus, while Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly found that
the UTPCPL applies to residential leases, the question remained
“whether the UTPCPL permit[ted] a person who leased property from
one entity to bring suit against another entity from which the
person initially attempted to lease property”, since no such court
has addressed such a situation.
The federal court ultimately refused to expand behind the plain
meaning of the UTPCPL’s text. In particular, the federal court rejected the couple’s plea
to liberally construe that text because, in doing so, the court
would have had to basically ignore the plain language of the text. In doing so, the federal court merely confirmed that the
UTPCPL only applies to consummated transactions.
*Alan Nochumson is the sole shareholder of Nochumson P.C. where he specializes in real estate, litigation, employment and labor, and land use and zoning. Mr. Nochumson regularly speaks at and writes for trade and professional associations, local universities, and adult education programs on issues commonly confronted by businesses, individuals, and professionals. Mr. Nochumson is also President of Bear Abstract Services where he offers comprehensive title insurance, title examination, and closing services for transactions ranging from simple residential agreements of sale to complex commercial projects. He may be reached by telephone at (215) 399-1346 or by e-mail at anochumson@nochumson.com.